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This study undertakes an econometric analysis of data on child care services usage and labor
force participation drawn from a survey of 1720 households in 15 “favelas” or slums, in Rio de
Janeiro.  The analysis examines the impact which access to child care services has on female labor
force participation and final earnings.
Child care services in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro are hard to find.  Less than one-third of
favela residents surveyed in 1995 had access to such services, which range in cost and quality from
rationed, low-cost, high quality public day care centers to higher-cost and lower-quality babysitting
services provided in the homes of neighborhood women. Untangling the earnings effects of having
access to child care services yields clear recommendations for a cost recovery strategy which could
facilitate the expansion of the publicly- financed network.
The central issue addressed in this paper is the estimation of  labor force participation and
child care choice decisions  through  limited dependent variable models, where the household’s
choice of mode of child care used and type of labor force participation is based upon the mother’s
characteristics, household characteristics, and the characteristics of child care alternatives available
within the community.  Earnings functions are estimated using reduced form and selectivity-
corrected specifications.  On this basis it is possible to derive a range of estimates for the different
model specifications of the increase in earnings attributable to the fact that the family utilizes child
care services outside the home.
The study represents a contribution to the empirical literature on female labor supply by
explicitly addressing the effect on earnings which is attributable to the decisions made by mothers
in choosing their work and child care arrangements.  In contrast to previous studies, it allows for a
variety of forms of labor force participation (work at home, full-time outside work, and part-time
outside work), as well as several child care alternatives.  By estimating earnings functions, as
opposed to subsuming earnings estimates as has been done in previous work, it yields the net
impact on working mothers’ wages of having access to child care services, which in turn informs
policies regarding cost recovery in formal child care.
Study results indicate that increasing the supply of low-cost child care in the favelas of Rio
de Janeiro would increase mothers’ labor force participation and their probability of utilizing public
care.  When they work, women who avail themselves of external child care services are also likely toearn more.  Estimates for earnings elasticities for public child care usage range from negligible
negative effects up to a twenty percent increase in earnings, dependent upon model specification
and sample definition.  The positive effect on earnings is least for women who work more than 40
hours per week.  
Study results also indicate that women who pay more for child care in the private sector are
also compensated by greater returns in the labor market—the elasticity of earnings with respect to
the use of higher-cost market care ranges from 12% to 29%.  Higher returns to market care are
most likely due to its greater flexibility in operating hours.  Limited hours of service available in the
public centers reduces their utility and net impact on earnings for women who work longer hours
and/or have long hours of commuting to their places of employment.
Despite the difficulties of interpreting the results due to the many endogeneities involved in
the joint decision process, increased earnings are consistently associated with use of child care
outside the home, independent of model specification and sample definition.  This finding has clear
policy implications.  Increased access to high quality child care services not only offers
developmental benefits for the children receiving care, as has been documented by previous studies,
but also expanded economic opportunities for their mothers. 
The range of earnings estimates indicate some limited scope for additional cost recovery at
the public centers, contingent upon hours worked by the mother.  However, these estimates
represent a lower bound for cost recovery potential—if the probability of working outside the
home as a result of greater access to public child care is factored in, and the expected value of the
total increase in earnings calculated, the scope for cost recovery increases.  Furthermore, expanding
the hours of operation of the public centers may well lead to increased earnings opportunities for
participating mothers. 
While the potential for recovering a larger share of operating costs of the public network
thus exists, differences observed in the returns to market versus public care suggest that the
provision of demand subsidies that allow women to choose their preferred mode of child care may
offer greater private returns in terms of increased earnings opportunities than further financing of
direct provision by the public sector.  This policy finding is further reinforced when the high social
costs of the public child care centers is considered. 
The fact that returns to market-provided care are much higher in all cases than returns to
the more expensive publicly provided care raises a series of questions regarding policies for future
expansion of coverage.  It perhaps behooves the city government to dedicate its scarce resources toraising the quality of market care (through regulation, supervision, licensing, etc.), combined with
the use of targeted subsidies for poor households in the form of vouchers to help defray the costs
of market care.  Even if the government funded the entire cost of the highest-priced market care
option, it would only amount to half of what is currently being spent per child for the direct
provision of child care services in the public centers.  And, the private sector care options offer
greater flexibility and higher labor market returns than do the public centers.
In conclusion, public financing (but not necessarily direct provision) of child care services
offers not only long-run hopes for poverty reduction, through improving the welfare and school-
readiness of children in poverty, but also offers a more immediate pay-off in the form of increased




I.  Background and Rationale
This paper attempts to answer a very simple question: Does child care pay?  The question is
posed from the perspective of a cost-conscious public policy-maker with a relatively narrow
economic perspective.   The question can be more precisely stated as follows:   do poor women
benefit from having access to publicly subsidized child care through increased, and better (e.g.
higher paying, formal sector jobs),  participation in the labor force?  While the economic benefits of
publicly funded child care — such as increased opportunities for labor force participation and
higher earnings — are commonly asserted by governments as justifications for funding of such
programs.  However, little concrete corroboration of these assertions can be found in the literature
either in the U.S. or in the developing country context.  Arriving at a clear answer to this relatively
simple and narrowly defined question requires some surprisingly torturous econometric analysis in
order to disentangle the web of joint causality and endogeneities embodied in the very basic work-
life decisions that all households must confront.   
With an aim towards estimating the magnitude of these potential economic benefits for
poor women of having access to publicly-funded child care services, the Inter-American
Development Bank , in partnership with the Social Development Secretariat of the Municipality of
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Rio de Janeiro, undertook a survey of households in 15 favelas, or urban slums, in Rio de Janeiero,
Brazil, during 1995.  Access to these communities was facilitated by the fact that they were home to
the first phase of the IDB-financed Slum Upgrading Program, and as such, community members
were accustomed to receiving visitors from the municipality and responding to questions about
their quality of life and household decisions.   A representative sample of 1720 households, each of
which was home to at least one child under the age of six, was surveyed.
The city government was eager to participate in the study, as increased funding for public
day care centers comprised part of the Slum Upgrading Program.  Each community in the sample
was slotted to receive a new public center, with space for 100 children.  These centers, or creches
offer high quality services which do not come cheaply.  Unit operating costs per month average
more than US$100 per child.  At the same time, cost recovery is so low as to be practically non-
existent, with the monthly fee charged per child about US$6.00, and often  waived.  An open  An estimate as of May 1997.
3
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question which we hoped to answer with this study is whether cost recovery could increase with no
net loss to household income.  In other words, it was hypothesized (and had been observed in
earlier descriptive analyses) that mothers with access to public day care centers would have
increased earnings opportunities.    Additionally, the widespread use of higher-cost, yet lower-
quality, private sector child care services within the favelas suggested a supply constraint in the
market.   Our hypothesis was that if positive earnings effects were sufficient, it would be possible to
increase monthly charges at the public centers, while still maintaining a net positive income effect
for the participating household.  This would offer a win-win opportunity, where greater funds
would be available to expand the  rationed network of full-service public care centers.  This would
improve access to care within these severely impoverished communities, as well as raise the quality
of the level of available care.
Early Childhood Care and Development Programs: A High Growth Area for Social
Investments in the LAC region
These questions are relevant beyond the slums of Rio de Janeiro.  Early childhood care and
development programs are receiving a resurgence of interest and public funding the world over. 
Child care programs offer both immediate and longer-term benefits which have drawn the attention
of social policy makers.  Custodial care allows the ever growing percentage of mothers in the labor
force alternatives for taking care of their children while working.  Integrated early childhood
development programs have empirically demonstrated positive longitudinal effects on the
subsequent social and economic development of participating children.  Thus, child care programs
are promoted as offering double benefits, wherein not only is the family’s income increased, but the
children themselves are provided critical extra support and attention that improves their school-
readiness and offers them a better chance of breaking the cycle of poverty.
The Inter-American Development Bank has joined the ranks of institutions who provide
financing for early childhood development programs, with roughly US$1.9 billion of its current
portfolio of loans in execution supporting early childhood development programs —either free-
standing day care programs, or pre-primary education.     Independent operations  in support of
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early childhood programs are increasingly common, but for the most part the IDB’s support to  See Moran, et. al., 1997. 
4
  For ease of exposition, the principal care provider will be referred to as the mother in the rest of this paper,
5
although in a limited number of cases in the study sample, that figure may be a grandmother, aunt, or foster parent.
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these programs has been contained as sub-components or activities within projects in education,
urban development and housing, integrated rural development, and social investment funds.   The
current pipeline continues this trend, with an increasing importance for independent early child care
programs grounded in national strategies or policies in this area, reflecting the growing status of
these programs within both the Bank and the borrowing countries. 
The newest generation of loans has begun the groundwork to measure the longitudinal
developmental effects for children receiving care in programs financed by the Bank by putting into
place more comprehensive monitoring and evaluation components.  However, such components
do not usually address the economic benefits of having access to child care services, as there is a
problem of selectivity—e.g. monitoring and evaluation components can, at their best, track labor
force effects for participating mothers, but in the absence of a previously defined random control
group (a design feature of monitoring and evaluation components which has yet to be incorporated
into IDB loans), it is difficult to determine the pure effects which specific investments in child care
services have on labor force participation and household income.
The IDB has done relatively more analytical work on the cost side of the cost-benefit
equation for such services.  Individual projects regularly perform cost-effectiveness analyses, and
offer cost comparators with alternative options for care provision.  Guidelines have been prepared 
to aid project managers in the standardization of such analyses.   Although it is difficult, the Bank is
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well on the way towards understanding how to estimate costs of  the various components of
integrated child care and development programs, and has begun building an institutional knowledge
base of comparative costs for such programs throughout the region.  
Quantitative estimates of the economic benefits of such programs, on the other hand, are
much harder to find.  In the following section, a brief review of the relevant empirical literature
sheds light on the complexities involved in deriving such estimates, and clarifies the value-added of
the current study. The discussion focusses on the methodological issues involved in quantifying the
economic returns to households in terms of increased opportunities for labor force participation of
the mother or principal care provider.   This paper does not attempt to address the more
5  See Zigler and Styfco (1993),  and Young (1995), for summaries of studies which demonstrate the longitudinal
6
benefits of investing in young children through child care and development programs, such as the U.S. Head Start program.
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complicated issue of quantifying in financial terms the longitudinal developmental benefits for
children at risk which result from having access to high quality early childhood development
programs.
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Unraveling Causalities: Child Care and Labor Force Participation
Initial attention to the interrelationships between child care usage and female labor force
participation can be found in Heckman’s (1974) pathbreaking article  which analyzed the effect of
government child-care programs on women’s employment decisions.   Initiating a series of research
efforts in the U.S. which focussed on the demand for and costs of child care, the essential insight of
the paper was that the implicit costs that families face for child care depend on the availability of
alternative care options, including the presence of relatives or friends willing to provide low-cost
care.  Later attempts included explicit estimates of the costs of child care based on household
characteristics, and modeling of the simultaneous labor market participation decision of both the
mother and the potential alternative care giver.
Due to the complex nature of the household decisions involved, the existing empirical
literature on child care usage and labor force participation reflects the need to focus on partial
aspects of the choices involved.  The literature to date can be divided into three camps.  First, some
studies focus on the demand for child care, paying close attention to the effects of  price and quality
on a household’s choice of child care.  These studies take the mother’s labor force participation and
other household income as a given, and pay more detailed attention to definition of the range of
child care options or modes, and measures of the price and quality of these modes.  A second
group of studies examines the labor force participation decision of the mother, taking child care
usage as given and have as a primary focus the examination of how usage of different modes of
child care results in varying degrees of labor force participation.  Finally, a third body of literature
models the simultaneous nature of the mother’s choice to participate in the labor force and to
utilize non-maternal child care.
Empirical work on demand for child care focuses on the determinants of the family’s choice of   Studies examining the determinants of household demand for child care include works by Robins and Spiegelmen,
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1978; Lehrer, 1988; Robins, 1988; Leibowitz et. al, 1988; and  Hofferth and Wissoker, 1992.
 Household composition factors include the availability of surrogate child care providers within the household and 
8
the age structure and number of children.  They affect the work/child care decision in a variety of ways.  For example, nursing
mothers of infants are less likely to use outside care.  Or, in the case of determining demand for center-based care, there are
little or no economies of scale in center-based care (for the purchasers’ of care), whereas babysitters in one’s own home or their
own residence do achieve economies of scale.
   Analyses of female labor force participation which explicitly take account of the availability or actual use of child
9
care as an exogenous factor in the participation decision include Gustaffson and Jacobson, 1985 ; Berger and Black, 1992;
Engle, 1991;  and Blau and Robins, 1988.
  Joint decision models of child care usage and labor force participation can be found in Connelly, 1992; Connelly,
10
et.al., 1996a and b; Gustaffson and Stafford, 1992; Michalopoulous, et.al, 1992; and Ribar, 1992 and 1995.
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child care arrangement.   This branch of the literature emphasizes the need to distinguish correctly
7
among the different modes of child care; examines issues of selection which impede the correct
estimation of the price of paid child care (households that use paid care are more likely to be able to
negotiate better rates); documents the difficulties involved in measuring quality of care; and
demonstrates the importance of household composition in determining what types of child care
arrangements are utilized.   In all of these studies, the decision of the principal care provider to
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participate in the market, and the value of her earned income, is taken as exogenous to the choice
of child care mode.
Labor force participation studies examine the other side of the behavioral equation.  Taking the
use of (or access to) child care as given, they examine the elasticity of the labor supply response of
women (married and single) to changes in the availability of child care outside the home.   These
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models follow the traditional literature on labor force participation, arguing that lack of child care
serves as a barrier to entry for mothers to participate in the labor force, and that the mother’s
reservation wage increases with the costs of child care (not to mention the desire to be with her
children).  In these studies, the child care decision is taken as an exogenous input to the decision of
whether or not to participate in the labor force.
Finally, joint decision models provide estimates of the choices households make regarding child
care and labor force participation of the mother, allowing both variables to be endogenously
determined.    Researchers differ in their approach to modelling the joint decision process, with
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some offering a staged process, wherein first one decision is made which then influences the other;
others present a fully structural joint decision model.  Attempts have also been made to include  Connelly, et. al., “Tackling Endogeneity...”, 1996.  Findings indicate that endogenizing the fertility decision does
11
not significantly change results from those found where fertility is taken as exogenous.
  Some studies do include the number of hours worked by the mother as an explanatory variable, and Gustafsson and
12
Stafford, 1992,follow a similar approach to that undertaken in this paper where the mother’s type of labor force participation
decision is a three way choice between zero hours worked, full-time work, and part-time work.  Here again, however, they do
not distinguish between paid work outside the home versus paid work done inside the home, a factor which has clear
implications for the joint child care decision.
 With a few exceptions (see work by Connelly et.al. 1996; Wong and Levine, 1992;  and Engle, 1991), the vast
13
majority of the literature to date has focused on the developed country context, with the policy relevant question concerning the
ways in which government tax and child care subsidy policies could induce changes in female labor force participation and/or
the demand for different modes of non-maternal child care.   See also Moser, 1996 for a discussion of household survival
strategies in urban areas of developing countries.
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household fertility as another endogenous choice variable in the overall nexus of household
decisions regarding labor force participation and child care.    
11
These studies have explicitly addressed differences in cost and availability of modes of child
care as important qualitative choice variables.  The choice to use child care services is not a simple,
binomial, yes or no choice, but it is recognized that important differences exist in the types of child
care utilized, which reflect differences in household and individual characteristics.  While labor force
participation is jointly determined with the decision to utilize different modes of child care, the
participation decision is modeled as a simple binomial choice variable—either a mother participates
in the labor force or not.  In other words, these studies fail to distinguish among types or sectors of
labor force participation.  Given that the mother’s choices regarding full or part-time work, and
working from home or outside the home, seem intimately linked with decisions regarding child-care
needs and usage, the previous lack of attention to type or sector of labor force participation appears
to be a gap in the existing literature—a gap which this study hopes to fill.     Attention to this issue
12
is of particular importance in the developing country context when analyzing the survival strategies
of poor households where participation in the formal sector labor market is the exception rather
than the rule.
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Without exception, the literature to date has focussed on estimating elasticities of labor
market supply and child care demand responses to changes in individual characteristics, household
characteristics, or the supply of child care.  Joint decision models usually follow a traditional
approach to modelling the labor force participation decision, first correcting for selectivity by
estimating the reservation wage of all women in the sample, and then modeling the labor force
participation decision using the predicted reservation wage as an independent variable.  Under this7
approach, predicted earnings become an independent variable in the labor force participation  and
child care use equations.  The question as to whether or not there is an earnings “premium” for
women from having access to certain types of child care is thus not addressed. 
To sum up, the literature reviewed shows a wide variety in the ambitiousness of authors in
tackling the various types of endogeneity which arise when addressing questions of female labor
force participation and choice of child care mode.  Trade-offs arise and as the complexity of the
empirical modelling increases, the level of detail of results regarding specific aspects declines. 
Nonetheless, some results are surprisingly robust on several counts:   Studies agree that child care
and labor force participation are competing uses of the time of mothers.  Lowering the cost of
child care, either through increased supply or forms of price subsidization, is shown to increase the
usage of “market care” (as opposed to care by the mother or a near relative), and, by lowering the
reservation wage of women, also leads to an increase in female labor force participation. Individual
characteristics of the mother, household composition, and supply-side characteristics of the child
care market in which the household takes part are all shown to influence the jointly determined
outcomes of mode of child care usage and labor force participation.  A gap remains in the literature
as to how mothers jointly decide not only among modes of child care, but among the types or
sectors of labor force participation.  This paper attempts to explore this issue in more detail. 
Furthermore, explicit estimation of selectivity-corrected earnings functions allows for the derivation
of policy relevant results regarding the increase in earnings, or “earnings premium” attributable to
the use and availability of different types of child care, offering an answer to the question raised in
the paper’s title. 
The Child Care Situation in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro
The fifteen neighborhoods which form the universe for the current study were also
surveyed in 1994 as part of the preparation for the Rio de Janeiro Slum Upgrading Program.  This
first survey in 1994 had as its objective the identification of the existing child care  and pre-school
education alternatives available in these communities, as well as information on users’ perceptions
of the quality of these alternatives. 
The original 1994 survey was not designed with the intention of providing data for rigorous
economic analysis.  Through interviews with a sample of roughly 900 families, however, it did 
provide rapid and cost-effective data on child placement options and household characteristics.   Responses to questions regarding the users’ perceptions of quality also rated the formal care as higher quality, with
14
the majority of survey respondents indicating a preference to switch from informal to formal care.  Contrary to many other
examples in the social services, in the case of child care in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the publicly provided care is not an
inferior good.
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Also during 1994,  a second phase of research was carried out consisting of site visits to the various
providers of child-care services identified in the initial survey, which yielded quality indicators for
the various modes of care available in the favelas.
The principal findings of this initial fieldwork helped to motivate the current study, and
allowed for a more careful definition of the survey instrument used.  More than eighty percent of
children in the target age group were found to stay at home during the day, the majority cared for
by their mothers.  The limited information regarding labor force participation found that nearly
two-thirds of mothers worked exclusively within the household with no market source of earnings;
some 10% performed paid work within their own homes;  under ten percent worked part-time; 
and 18% worked full-time outside the home.  When asked about their  likelihood of changing
employment if child care services were made available (either through seeking outside employment
or increasing the numbers of hours working outside the home),  nearly two-thirds of the mothers
who were not already working full-time responded positively.  Strong positive correlations were
found between usage of full-time child care outside the home and formal sector occupation.  
The 1994 field work also yielded interesting findings regarding the range of child care
alternatives available within Rio’s slums.  Services range from the public day care centers to informal
baby-sitting services known as mãe-crecheiras.  While informal services did offer greater flexibility
regarding operating times, this seemed to be their only comparative advantage.  Site visits showed
the municipal centers, as well as the centers run by the network of philanthropic organizations
supported by the municipality, to be of higher quality than the informal providers, as measured by
staff-children ratios, the range of developmental activities pursued, the availability of supervisory
resources, nutritional inputs, and the quality of the physical facilities.   This formal care, available in
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public or quasi-public centers, cost significantly less than the higher-priced informal baby-sitting
services, suggesting excess demand for child-care services and a highly rationed public supply, with
the public and philanthropically run centers then charging R$4 per month, as compared to an
average of R$30 per month, nearly one third of the monthly minimum wage, charged at the lower
quality home-run babysitting services.    Each favela surveyed was considered a geographic strata of the sample, with clusters defined of ten households,
15
based upon maps provided by IPLAN-Rio, the municipal planning agency.  Sample size was determined based upon the
percentage of households with the target population of children under six years of age (30%) and in order to guarantee a
representative random sample. Of a total of 2,290 clusters defined, the sample surveyed was comprised of 753 clusters, divided
proportionately by community.   In each cluster, all households with children in the target group were interviewed, for a total of
1731 households surveyed.  A detailed description of sampling methodology can be found in PRODEMAN, 1996, Annex One:
Considerações sobre o Plano de Amostragem.




In general, the 1994 findings suggested the need for a more detailed study and rigorous
analytical work regarding the capacity and willingness to pay for child care services in the favelas of
Rio de Janeiro.  Towards that end, data for this study were collected in a random household survey
carried out in the same 15 favelas of Rio de Janeiro during the last quarter of 1995.
II.  Data, Theoretical Framework and Methodology
The Sample
The data for the current paper come from a random sample of 1731 households with
children under the age of six  surveyed in fifteen favelas in Rio de Janeiro during November and
December of 1995.   The final sample utilized for the quantitative analysis, subsequent to cleaning
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the data and deleting missing or contradictory observations, was 1720 households.    In a
subsequent round of interviews, an oversampling was done of 81 households who utilized publicly
funded day care centers, in order to provide sufficient observations for this group with which to
carry out the econometric analysis.  In the following analysis, these observations are appropriately
weighted in accordance with their occurrence in the random sample.
The survey instrument, designed specifically for this study, elicited information on individual
characteristics of the mother or principal child care provider  and other household members (age,
16
education, income earned);  child care arrangements utilized;  and labor force participation of all
household members.  The survey also contained questions regarding length of residence in the
community and the number of relatives residing near by to measure the household’s ability to
receive financial or child care support from family members or other social networks in the
community.
Table 1 provides a summary description of the 1995 sample, organized into a series of  Respondents were classified according to the childcare arrangements used for their oldest child younger than six. 
17
In 41% of the cases, there was only one child in the household within the target age group, 31% of survey respondents had two
children under six years of age, 17% three, and the remaining 11 percent had four or more children under the age of six.
  For ease of subsequent exposition, this group is often referred to as public childcare throughout the rest of this
18
paper, as public and quasi-public day care centers provide the majority of supply in this cell.
  Due to poor wording of the questionnaire, the ability to make this distinction was not readily available.  The
19
mother, or principal caregiver, was asked the question: “Where does your child stay during the day?”  Respondents were given
a choice of options including at home with someone taking care of the child, and at home with no one taking care of the child,
but the nature of the relationship of the home caretaker to the child was not specified (less than one percent of the sample
responded that the child was at home with no responsible party).
10
twelve diads based on mututally exclusive and exhaustive child care modes and labor force
participation options which were chosen for purposes of analyses.   The guiding principle in
17
defining the categories was to distinguish factors of both cost of child care, ability to pay, time
working, and location of work and child care  which would jointly affect the labor force/child care
decision.  Child care options are broken down into three modes: High-cost child care options (all of
which were provided outside the home), costing more than 10 reais per month, low-cost child care
outside the home, consisting mainly of publicly- or philanthropically-funded day care centers as well
as care provided by relatives or other babysitters outside the home for minimal charge,    and low-
18
cost child care within the home. In this last category, we did not distinguish between care provided
by the mother herself versus care provided by other family members for little or no charge.   Two-
19
thirds of children under the age of six are cared for in their own homes (66%), with the remaining
third of children split between low-cost and high-cost child care options outside their homes. 
Labor force participation options are broken down into four categories: zero earnings,
home employment (including unearned income from pension or disability payments), earnings
from part-time employment outside the home, and earnings from full-time employment outside the
home.  More than half of the survey respondents did not receive any earnings whatsoever, with
roughly one-quarter working full-time outside the home, and the remaining quarter split fairly
evenly between home earnings and part-time earnings.
Definitions of full-time and part-time earnings are perhaps distinct to this sample of low-
income slum residents.  Women who work less than 40 hours a week are deemed part-time; while
those who work 40 hours or more per week are classified as full-time workers.  11
Table 1: Sample Distribution by Participation/Child Care Diad and Selected Mean Values
Women with Children Under Six Years of Age, Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
(Mean values in current reais per month)
Entire Sample
n =  1720
Fam Inc. Per. Cap:   64.4
Cost of Child Care:    8.0
Mother’s Earnings:  82.4 (66%) Home
Low-Cost Child Care Modes (Less High-Cost Child





Zero earnings (52%) n = 763 n = 69 n = 67
Family Income Per Capita 70.4 64.3 85.4
Cost of Child Care 0.0 2.1 29.4
Mother’s Earnings 0.0 0.0 0.0
Home employment or unearned income  (12%) n = 152 n = 34 n = 22
Family Income Per Capita 56.2 53.2 84.2
Cost of Child Care 0.0 1.3 49.2
Mother’s Earnings 134.3 139.0 205.0
Earnings from part-time  employment outside the
home  (12%) n = 89 n = 65 n = 47
Family Income Per Capita 52.1 61.2 83.9
Cost of Child Care 0.0 1.7 41.6
Mother’s Earnings 150.7 185.7 201.0
Earnings from full-time employment outside the
home (24%) n = 132 n = 116 n = 164
Family Income Per Capita 52.0 49.5 57.7
Cost of Child Care 0.0 1.8 50.2
Mother’s Earnings 171.7 176.7 207.5
Note:    Estimates of the poverty line in Brazil for 1995 vary, including:  R$64 per month (World Bank poverty assessment);
R$108 per month (Psacharopoulos, et. al.); R$102 per month (GDP PPP, $60 per month); and R$92 per month (Consumption
PPP, $60 per month).  Sixty percent of the sample reported family income per capita below the low-end poverty line of R$64
per month used in the World Bank poverty assessment.  
The sample mean of hours worked per week was 42 hours, with 17% of survey respondents
working more than 60 hours per week. The wide variability in weekly hours worked reflects the large
participation of survey respondents in the informal labor market. Thirty-seven percent of respondents  Estimates of the poverty line in Brazil for 1995 vary, including:  R$64 per month (World Bank poverty
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assessment); R$108 per month (Psacharopoulos, et. al.); R$102 per month   (GDP PPP, $60 per month); and R$92 per month
(Consumption PPP, $60 per month).  Sixty percent of the sample reported family income per capita below the lowest poverty
line of R$64 per month used in the World Bank poverty assessment.  
  Roughly one-quarter of the survey respondents overall resided in female-headed households with eight percent of
21
mothers residing in households with no other adults.  Need to verify distribution of female headed households by cell.
12
classified themselves as domestic workers, and one-quarter were self-employed.  Forty hour work weeks
and nine to five jobs are the exception rather than the rule, and there seems to be willingness to accept
low hourly wages in order to achieve monthly earnings targets.
Also provided in Table 1 are summary data on family income per capita, mother’s earnings, and
the cost of child care, for each of the twelve labor force participation/child care diads.  As would be
expected, higher family income per capita is positively correlated with the use of high-cost child care
outside the home, as are higher earnings of the mother.  The sample is relatively clustered at the
extremes—the two diads with the largest numbers of observations are mothers with zero earnings who
care for their children at home, and mothers with earnings from full-time employment who utilize high-
cost child care options outside the home. 
Without exception, the families surveyed reported incomes per capita of less than one minimum
salary (R$100 at the time) per month.   Per capita family incomes were, on average,  lower for families
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where the mothers worked from the home or received unearned income (pension or disability payments)
than for families where the mothers did not work at all,  suggesting that mothers with zero earnings may
be “buying” leisure time and the option to stay home with their children due to higher family income. 
Lowest per capita family incomes, (despite the strength of the mother’s earnings) were observed for
households where the mother worked full-time outside the home, suggesting a prevalence of female-
headed households in this category. The survey shows that families with higher income spend a greater
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share of it on child care.  This could indicate that child care is a luxury good, with an income elasticity
greater than 1.  It could also result from women with higher earning capacity choosing to enter the labor
force given the greater opportunity cost for the household of lost earnings.  
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Methodology
This paper estimates a series of partial equilibrium approximations of the complex child
care/labor force participation decision rather than estimating a fully endogenous structural model of the
joint decision process.  This is done in order to facilitate interpretation of each set of results and to yield  An initial attempt was made to explicitly model the joint decision process, using the multinomial logit technique to
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estimate the effects of individual, household, and child care supply characteristics on the probability of households being in
each of the twelve diads mapped in Table 1, followed by an estimation of earnings function for each of the labor force
participant cells. Specific findings of this model were generally consistent with the results presented below, although the
complexity of the model prevented straight-forward interpretation of overall results.
 We also take previous fertility decisions as exogenous variables, although decisions about the number of children to
23
have may also be related to choices made regarding labor force participation and the type of child care options.  Recent research
by Connelly, et.al. (1997) suggests that endogenizing the fertility decision does not significantly change results regarding child
care choice and labor force participation decisions.
  There are a range of models for how the household maximization decision occurs which can be broken down into
24
three strands: family utility models, bargaining, or game theoretic models, and notions of market exchange within the
household.  See Apps and Rees (1994) for a discussion of the latter two and Ransom (1987) for a discussion of the former.
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clear estimates of final earnings outcomes.  The decision to participate in the child care market, and the
decision to participate in the labor market are each estimated separately, and the results from these
estimates then used to control for selection in subsequent estimations of the final effect on earnings.   
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Borrowing from the literature on discrimination, the decision process is modelled in such a way that
earnings functions are an output rather than an input, enabling an explicit estimation of the impact on
final earnings of the two decisions regarding type of work and type of child care.  
  The methodology used thus arrives at a range of estimates for the elasticity of earnings with
respect to utilization of low-cost care and higher cost informal services with corrections for varying
degrees of endogeneities.  While no one result is conclusive, taken together the two participation estimates
and the series of earnings equations offer a picture of the factors at play which influence household
decisions regarding labor force participation and child care usage, as well as some clear indications that use
of child care services outside the home, all else being equal, tends to result in increased earnings.
The estimates presented below model the participation and child care decisions as choices  in
which family members make this decision taking the decisons of other family members as given.  The
weakness of this approach is obvious, if we believe that household members enter into jointly bargained
decisions regarding  labor force participation and the allocation of domestic tasks and negotiate amongst
themselves regarding how total household resources are allocated.       However, the principal
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motivation driving this research was the goal of obtaining decent estimates of the final earnings outcomes
resulting from the labor force participation/child care decision that could be used to define future cost
recovery strategies.  Thus, the individual choice framework was maintained, despite its limitations with
respect to capturing the full complexity of the household’s decision making process.  The approach
followed allowed for the disentangling of the issues regarding the distribution of types of employment and
child care usage and  self-selection into the labor force, while at the same time retaining the ability to then  The derivation of an estimator for the sample selection model when the selection is based on the multinomial logit
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model is described in Lee, 1983.  The specific estimation procedure utilized is outlined in Greene, 1992, pp. 618-622.
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systematically compare the earnings equations of individuals who opted for different participation or child
care strategies.
To estimate earnings functions (and subsequently analyze the sources of differences in pay due to
differences in the type of child care used), taking some account of family factors and the bias introduced
by having a censored sample (earnings are only observed for workers, child care is only used by those
who can afford it or have access to it), a selectivity model in the Heckman tradition is utilized.  The
sample includes all primary care givers in the survey, whether they are working or not, and whether or not
they are paying for child care.  The series of earnings estimates presented thus first allows for
simultaneous control of selection in the decision to participate in the labor market and for selection in the
type of participation chosen (e.g. full-time, part-time, work from home).  The second set of estimates
controls for selection into the type of child care used.  Use of multinomial logit estimation allows for a
decomposition into human capital, household, child care availability, and unexplained factors of the
probability that individuals make different participation or child care decisions.  Two sets of selectivity
controls, or weights, can be calculated from the estimates of the logit equations, and then included in the
earnings functions as a control for sample self-selection bias.
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III.  Estimation of Choice Models
In this section, estimation results are presented for two separate choice models.  The first models
the mother’s decision of whether or not to participate in the labor force, and in what way (working from
home, working part-time outside the home, and working full-time outside the home), using a multinomial
logit estimation technique in which the probability of each of the three choice options (relative to the
base option of not working for pay) is estimated, based upon a series of individual, household, and child
care supply characteristics.  The second choice model considers the mother’s decision of whether or not
to use paid child care services.  Following a similar methodology, a multinomial logit estimation is done to
determine the probability of using low cost public care, or high cost market care (versus using no paid
child care services outside the home).  Given the hypothesis that the child care usage and labor force
participation decisions are in fact determined jointly, although the models provide separate estimates for
each decision, each estimate uses the full set of independent variables.  The estimates can thus be loosely
interpretated as reduced forms of the fully endogenous choice model.15
Descriptive Data for Participation Decisions
Table 2 presents the variables used in the labor force participation and child care decisions
together with their descriptive statistics.  The first two columns present the information for on variable
mean and standard deviation for the entire sample, while the third and fourth columns present the
information for the subset of individuals who work outside the home.  This subsample was used to
estimate the child care choice model which takes labor force participation as given.  Individual characteristics
include potential experience in the labor force (age minus years of schooling minus 6); experience squared, 
years of schooling, and years residing in the community.  The latter was used as a measure of the
individual’s ability to draw upon neighborhood resources, both in locating employment and in accessing
informal childcare (or getting to the front of the line in the queue for rationed public rationed care).  
 For household characteristics, we use the sum total of household income from sources other than the
primary care giver, the number of children less than six years old (the target group for child care), the
number of children between the ages of 7 and 15,  and the number of other adults, defined as those older
than fifteen years.   Children older than six years of age and other adults are included as potential
substitute child care providers.  We also include a variable measuring the number of relatives living nearby
in the same community, who also represent potential care providers.
Finally, the last grouping of independent variables measures characteristics of the supply of child care
confronted by the household.  The average neighborhood cost of child care is the price charged per child
in paid care, averaged for each of the 15 communities surveyed.  The final variable measures the availability
of low cost publically provided care in the community, and specifically calculates the percentage of
children in the target group who are enrolled in publicly funded day care centers for each of the 15
localities surveyed.16
Table 2: Variable Classification and Descriptive Statistics
Women with Children Under Six Years of Age, Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Sample for Labor Force Sample for Child Care
Participation Choice Model Choice Model
n = 1799 n = 676
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Individual Characteristics
Experience 17.18 7.92 17.74 7.72
Schooling 5.46 2.91 5.58 3.11
Years residing in community 13.51 10.82 14.34 11.20
Household Characteristics
Other household income 289.38 293.28 261.89 301.48
# of children under age 6 1.34 0.60 1.28 0.55
# of children aged 7 - 15 0.73 0.98 0.83 1.05
# of other adults 1.55 1.17 1.54 1.25
# of relatives in the community 7.62 11.09 7.93 11.43
Child Care Supply Characteristics
Average neighborhood cost of child 30.19 8.83 30.01 9.33
care
Percentage of children using public care 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Multinomial Logit Results for the Labor Force Participation Decision
Results of the labor force participation model are presented in Table 3.   In general, the results are
consistent with previous findings in the literature.   Highly significant negative constants reflect the low
likelihood of labor force participation.  Human capital variables of experience and schooling take on the
expected signs.  The “social capital” variables, of years residing in the community and the number of
relatives in the community are in most cases  not significant, although the number of years in the
community does increase the likelihood of having a full-time job outside the home.  
An implicit division of labor seems to exist within the household, as increased income from other
members of the household has a uniformly negative effect on the probability of the mother taking on
work for pay.  Furthermore, young children and labor force participation are shown to make conflicting
demands on the time of mothers, with the presence of children under the age of six consistently lowering17
the probability of paid work.  This effect is greatest and most significant in reducing the likelihood of the
mother working full-time outside the home.  Older children, however, have the opposite effect, showing a
strongly positive influence on the likelihood of the mother to take on paid work in all three categories. 
This may be attributed both to the increased household demand for income as there are more mouths to
feed, and to the capacity of the older children to take on increasing responsibilities in the household (this
latter aspect is confirmed by the results of the child care choice estimates, presented below).  The number
of other adults in the household, another measure of potential substitute care providers, has a strong and
significant effect on increasing the likelihood of the mother taking on a full-time job outside the home.
Increases in the supply of publicly provided child care are seen to be the single most important
factors in increasing the likelihood of women in the sample to work outside the home, either part-time or
full-time.  While, as expected, the child care supply effect shows little significance in influencing the
probability of women taking on paid work within the home, it is strongly significant and positive in the
other two cells.  This finding has clear policy implications in terms of the income generation effects of
providing greater access to child care.
Multinomial Logit Results for the Decision to Participate the Child Care Market
 Table 4 presents the results for the multinomial logit model of decision to participate in the child
care market.  The default option is not to use child care outside the home, with the two observed choices
being the use of  low-cost (mainly publicly provided) care, and the use of  high- cost care outside the
home.  The estimated model has low predictive power.  The only included variables which appear to have
a significant impact on the choice of child care mode are the presence of substitute care providers (either
older children or other adults), and the child care supply variables (but only for the users of public care). 
In other words, individual human capital characteristics, the “social capital” characteristics, and the
household income effect do not help to predict whether or not mothers will choose to use childcare
outside the home, either publicly provided, or market-based.  The major factors influencing such a
decision appear to be the presence of substitute care providers within the household (which has troubling
policy implications in terms of keeping older siblings, particularly girls, from completing their schooling).
For users of public care, availability and relative affordability are the chief explanatory factors.  In brief,
increasing the supply of public care will lead to an increase in its use, and, as a collateral benefit, will most
likely allow older siblings to dedicate more time to their own schooling rather than to provide substitute
child care services.18
Table 3 : Multinomial Logit Results for  Labor Force Participation Decision
Women with children under six years of age 
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates, n = 1799, Chi-Squared = (150.45)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Joint Decision Outcome Home Earnings Part-Time Earnings Full-Time Earnings
Constant  -2.917** -2.926** -2.223**
      (-4.925) (-4.797) (-4.833)
Experience   0.0795** 0.0821** 0.081**
 (2.158) (2.052) (2.685)
Experience Squared -0.0007 -0.121 -0.002**
(-0.866) (-1.301) (-2.181)
Schooling   0.132** 0.090 ** 0.083**
 (4.410) (2.934) 3.492
# of Relatives in -0.001 0.002 0.002
Community (-0.178) (0.358) (0.400)
Years Residing in 0.009 0.011 0.111*
Community (1.196) (1.338) (1.797)
Other Household Income -0.0005* -0.0003 -0.001**
(-1.687) (-0.958) (-4.361)
No. of Children  -0.241* -0.273** -0.419**
Under 6 (-1.799) (-1.998) (-3.848)
No. Of Children 0.219** 0.244**  0.159**
Aged 6 - 15 (2.745) (3.030) 2.448
No. of Other Adults 0.014 -0.076 0.170 **
(0.181) (-0.922) (2.973)
Average Neighborhood -0.010 -0.245 0.007
Cost of Child Care (-1.024) (-0.258) (0.997)
Percentage of Children in
Publicly Funded Care 1.051 4.065 ** 4.582**
(0.772) (3.061) (4.382)
*    significant at 10% level
**   significant at 5% level 19
Table 4: Multinomial Logit Results for Child Care Choice Decision
Women with children under six years of age who work and use child care outside the home
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates, n = 676, Chi-Squared = (116.40)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Joint Decision Outcome User of Low Cost User of High Cost Care
Care    
Constant 0.209 1.445*
      (0.252) (1.893)
Experience   0.0293 -0.006
 (0.538) (-0.120)
Experience Squared  0.0000 0.0004
( 0.018) (0.339)
Schooling   0.014 0.046
 (0.367) (1.277)
# of Relatives in Community -0.0000 -0.0037
( 0.009) (-0.410)
Years Residing in Community -0.001 -0.002
(-0.122 (-0.213)
Other Household Income  0.0004 0.0004
( 1.026) (1.072)
No. of Children  -0.002 -0.260
Under 6 (-0.013) (-1.392)
No. Of Children -0.330** -0.544**
Aged 6 - 15 (-3.207) (-5.086)
No. of Other Adults -0.398** -0.247**
(-3.960) (-2.801)
Average Neighborhood Cost of -0.024* -0.005
Child Care (-1.898) (-0.534)
Percentage of Children in Publicly
Funded Care 7.211** 0.742
(4.165) (0.502)
*    significant at 10% level
**   significant at 5% level   See Cox and Psacharopoulos (1992) for another example of this specification of the earnings function.
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IV.  Determination of Earnings Outcomes
This section presents a range of estimates for earnings equations,  with varying degrees of
disaggregation of the sample and correcting for endogenity of the various participation decisions.  Given
that the completely endogenous structural model is not estimated, none of the earnings estimates
presented are completely free from some type of bias.  Accordingly, a range of possible estimates for the
elasticity of earnings with respect to child care utilization will be presented based on these findings which
are robust to changes in specification and sample size.  
Descriptive Data for Earnings Functions
Table 5 presents the list of variables and their descriptive statistics used for the estimation of
earnings functions.  Descriptive statistics are presented for the various sub-samples for which earnings
functions were estimated, including the entire sample of women with earned income (892 observations),
only women who work for pay outside the home (676 observations), and separate sub-samples for home-
workers, part-time workers, and full-time workers (216, 226, and 450 observations respectively).  These
last three sub-samples conform to the choice options in the labor force participation model, while the
sub-sample excluding women who work for pay within the home conforms to the sample used in the
child care decision model.
Rather than using the natural log of hourly earnings as the dependent variable, which constrains
the elasticity of earnings with respect to hours worked to be equal to unity, a more flexible functional
form is used, wherein the natural log of monthly earnings is the dependent variable, and the natural log of
hours worked per month is entered into the right hand side of the equation as an exogenous variable. 
This specification is particularly apt for this sample of favela residents, as there is great variability in hours
worked with many women working much more than a “full-time” week of 40 hours, suggesting that the
returns to each additional hour worked are not uniform.   
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Table 5: Variable Classification and Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Estimates
Women with Children Under Six Years of Age, Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Data for Mincerian  Home Earnings Earnings Earnings
Earnings Functions
All Earnings Exclude Home Part-time Full-time Earnings
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
n=892 n=676 n = 216 n = 226 n = 450
Ln of Monthly Earnings 4.97 0.61 5.06 0.52 4.67 0.74 4.97 0.59 5.11 0.48
Schooling 5.62 3.03 5.58 3.11 5.75 2.77 5.50 3.21 5.62 3.01
Experience 18.01 7.93 17.74 7.72 19.11 8.47 18.34 7.78 17.42 7.68
Experience Squared 389.21 343.61 374.05 321.73 436.64 401.68 396.95 324.03 362.54 320.31
Int: Exp & # of Children 40.51 32.75 40.08 34.05 41.84 28.33 42.67 34.55 38.79 33.77
            Ln of Monthly Hours 3.61 0.63 3.66 0.48 3.33 1.08 3.15 0.49 3.91 0.18
Uses Market Childcare 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.41 0.40 0.49
Uses Public Childcare 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.46
Earnings estimates are based on the traditional Mincerian approach, wherein returns in the labor
market are hypothesized to be a result of investment in human capital, measured by years of schooling
and experience.  An interaction term for the proxy experience variable and the number of children is also
introduced, in order to better capture the women’s actual experience rather than potential experience. 
Locality control variables were introduced in earlier estimates of the earnings functions, measuring average
family income per capita in each community as a proxy for local economic opportunities, but showed no
explanatory power.  The earnings functions also include two dummy variables, the first of which takes on
the value of one if the individual uses public (low cost outside home) child care and zero otherwise, and
the second which does the same for the utilization of market care.  These variables should capture the
effect of  utilization of child care services on earnings, ceterus paribus.
Overview of Earnings Determinants
Table 6 presents an overview of the estimation results from the various specifications of
Mincerian functions.  Reduced form estimates provide no correction for selection into the labor force or
selection into the child care market.  The second set of estimates corrects for selection into the labor
force, while the last row of the table provides earnings estimates corrected for selection to the child care




sub-sample, there is little variation in the signs and significance of the determinants of earnings with or
without selection controls.  In fact, selection controls themselves are only significant in the case of home
earners, when correcting for self-selection into the labor market.  A strong positive sign on the selection
control can be attributed to high productivity in unobservables in home production, relative to
productivity in unobservables in other sectors, as well as a lower dispersion of returns to hours worked in
home for pay as opposed to work outside the home.  Based on the model used for the child care and
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labor force participation decisions we cannot show conclusively that selection is an issue.  This could be
explained by either of two possibilities.  First, the choice models may not be adequately specified, and it
might be possible to include other explanatory variables which would raise their predictive power and
increase the final impact of selection.  Or, selection might not be much of an issue in this sample—the
population is relatively homogeneous, with low-income households having limited choice about whether
or not mothers participate in the labor force.  And, given the rationed nature of the supply of public child
care, again, choice is limited—ramdomness and luck are perhaps better determinants of whether or not
public care is utilized than individual choice.
A more important factor leading to differences in the determinants of earnings seems to be the
definition of the sample itself.  In particular, the sub-sample of women who work less than 40 hours a
week outside the home face negative (but insignificant) returns to experience, with higher earnings
positively related to experience squared and the interaction term of experience and children, in contrast to
other sample differences.   These differences remain independent of correction for self-selection into the
various types of labor force participation.  Unobservable factors which might explain this reversal of the
expected signs on these coefficients in the sample of part-time workers include a high preference to
spend more time with their children, despite of the opportunity cost of potential returns to their human
capital in the labor market and or higher average age of this sub-sample.
Years of schooling is a strong explanatory variable across the board, independent of model
specification and sample definition.  Significant returns to education are consistent with other estimates of
earnings functions in Brazil.  The importance of education in increasing the earnings potential of labor
force participants and as a strategy for poverty reduction  is thus once again reinforced by the results of
this study.  
Turning now to the variables of particular interest for this study, usage of child care outside the  Even though the public day care centers already operate, on average, 10 hours per day, more than one-third of the
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survey respondents said that they would prefer longer operating hours.  Also, the public centers have fixed hours, whereas some
types of market care have more flexibility.
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home, we observe a strong and significant  positive effect on earnings across the board for women who
use market child care (with the one exception of women who work for pay from home with selection
controls for labor force participation choice).  In contrast, public child care use is only sometimes
positively related to an increase in earnings, and when this effect is significant, it is always less than that
for use of market care.  Table 7 summarizes the estimates of the predicted changes in earnings observed
for the use of market or low-cost public care.  When they work, women who avail themselves of external
child care services are for the most part likely to earn more.  Estimates for earnings elasticities for public
child care usage range from negligible negative effects up to a twenty percent increase in earnings,
depending upon model specification and sample definition.  The positive effect on earnings of utilization
of this relatively low cost child care outside the home is least for women who work more than 40 hours
per week.  
Study results also indicate that women who pay more for child care in the private sector are also
compensated by greater returns in the labor market—the elasticity of earnings with respect to the use of
higher cost market care ranges from 12% to 29%.  This difference cannot be attributed to women with
higher earnings switching their children from public to market care since public care was shown in
previous studies to be of higher quality.  Rather, higher returns to market care are most likely due to its
greater flexibility in operating hours.  Limited hours of service available in the public centers reduces their
utility and net impact on earnings for women who work longer hours and/or have long hours of
commuting to their places of employment despite their higher quality in terms of achieving child
development goals.
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  The scope for additional cost recovery from users of public child care centers is limited by the
relatively low earnings elasticities.  Absolute increases in earnings attributable to use of public centers
range from small negative values of R$1 per month to the substantial positive increase of R$28 per month
estimated for women who work less than 40 hours a week, corrected for labor force participation
selection.  The current user fees of R$6 per month, even under the most optimistic scenario, represent
more than 20 percent of the increase in earnings attributable to the use of the child care centers.  
However, the estimates of earnings increases presented in Table 7 represent a lower bound for cost
recovery potential—if the probability of working outside the home as a result of greater access to public
child care is factored in, and the expected value of the total increase in earnings calculated, the scope for24
cost recovery increases.  Furthermore, expanding the hours of operation of the public centers may well
lead to increased earnings opportunities for participating mothers.   For example, if publicly funded care
had the same flexibility, or other desired features,  as private-sector care, women’s earnings could increase
by as much as 29%.
Table 6: Summary of Earnings Functions Estimates
Women with Children Under Six Years of Age, Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Sample
Definition
# of Adjusted Constant Schooling Experience Experien Experience*Chi Ln.of Uses Uses Selection 
Obs. R cesquare ldren Monthly Market Public Controls




All Earners 892 .126 4.46 .048 + - - .0004 .257 .111
** ** ** ** **
Exclude 676 .135 3.63 .051 + + -.001 .184 .154 +
Home ** ** * ** **
Earners
Home 216 .032 3.89 .048 .046 - - + + +
Earners  ** ** **
Part-time  226 .130 3.84 .052 - + + .027 .232 .173
Earners ** ** **
Full-time 450 .139 4.50 .052 .022 - -.003 + .117 -
Earners ** ** ** ** **
Selection Controls for Labor Force Participation Decision
Home 216 .044 + .099 .07 - + + .214 + 1.24
Earners ** ** ** *
Part-time 226 .127 3.565 .055 - + + .27 .229 .180 +
Earners ** ** ** ** **
(1- 39
hours)
Full-time 450 .142 4.23 .055 .025 - -.003 .011 .11 - +
Earners ** ** ** ** ** **
(40 +
hours)
Selection Controls for Choice of Child Care Mode
Full and 676 .134 3.66 .052 + - - .19 .175 .086 -
Part-time ** ** ** ** **
Earners25
V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
A general conclusion of the study is that public financing of child care services (through direct
supply of services, or inducing demand through subsidies)  offers not only long-run hopes for poverty
reduction, through improving the welfare and school-readiness of children in poverty, but also yields a
more immediate pay-off in the form of increased employment and earnings opportunities for the mothers
who are able to utilize such services.  Social returns of these long-term developmental benefits justify
public investment in child care services.  Short-term private returns in the labor market for mothers who
benefit from child care services indicate potential for increased cost recovery, which is always welcome in
this age of fiscal restraint.  
The differences observed in the returns to market versus public care suggest that the provision of
demand subsidies which would allow households to choose among alternative child care arrangements
may offer greater private returns in terms of increased earnings opportunities than further financing of
direct provision by the public sector.  This has clear policy implications in terms of intended expansion of
the public network.  In choosing among alternatives to expand coverage of child care, policy-makers must
therefore weigh possible trade-offs between quality of care versus utility for households.  The evidence
presented in this paper suggests that the quality of developmental care for the child may not enter as
heavily into the households’ utility function as does flexibility of hours and ability to pursue full time
work.  One option for the public sector to ensure adequate quality care is by providing it directly. 
However, this is a high cost option, that would become even more expensive if the public sector were to
expand hours so as to meet the demands of households for custodial care.   Instead, a more cost-effective
option for expanding coverage would be to improve the quality of private sector care through
implementing policies such as increased regulation and licensing requirements.  The two
options—expanding coverage through increasing the public network of child care centers and expanding
coverage through the provision of demand subsidies—can be assessed by considering their relative costs. 
A subsidy of R$50 per month would cover the most expensive private sector alternative,  and still lead to
a fifty percent savings in unit cost per child as compared to the operating costs of the existing public
centers.  Furthermore, the mother who uses this subsidy to avail herself of private care is likely to earn
more than she would if utilizing a public center.
    The current results offer a strong argument in favor of allowing women this choice between the
private and public sectors.  However, more research needs to be done on the relative quality of public26
versus private care, and the development of methods to guarantee that longitudinal developmental
benefits for children would be preserved.
Table 7: Predicted Changes in Earnings 
attributable to Child Care Usage --Range of Estimates
Women with Children Under Six Years of Age, Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1995
Predicted Monthly Earnings Percentage Changes
Base With With Public Care Market Care
Monthly Public Care Market Care
Earnings
Reduced Form Estimates
All 141.4 158 182.8 11.7 29.3
Full & Part-time  158.3 168.2 184.7 6.3 16.6
Home  106.9 109.4 134.1 2.3 2.5
Part-time  144 171.3 181.6 18.9 26.1
Full-time  166.3 165.2 186.9 -0.1 12.4
Correct for Labor Force Participation
Home  145.3 151.7 179.9 4.4 23.8
Part-time 144 172.4 181.2 19.7 25.8
Full-time  166 164.6 185.7 -0.1 11.9
Correct for Child Care Mode Selection
Full & Part-time  158.3 172.6 188.6 0.1 19.1
Note: Market care ranges in price from R$19 to R$52 per month, per child.  Public care, or low-cost care outside the home, ranges in price
from R$6 per month to R$10 per month.27
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